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Abstract 
Providing an effective accounting scheme for 
decentralized peer-to-peer systems is difficult without 
relying on a central server or peers with special 
trusted status.  In this paper, we present Probabilistic 
Quorum-based Accounting (PQA) for peer-to-peer 
systems.  In our approach, a peer receiving a request 
will retrieve resource usage accounting information 
about the requesting peer from a quorum of peers to 
determine whether or not to grant the request.  Our 
solution is completely decentralized and does not 
require a special trusted status for any peers. 
1. Introduction 
Many distributed applications are designed to run on 
top of peer-to-peer (p2p) routing infrastructures, such 
as [1,2,3].  These applications range from distributed 
storage systems [4,5] to web caching [6,7] to media 
streaming [8,9]. 
 
Although p2p designs offer many benefits, such as 
reduced costs and scalability, they also offer new 
opportunities for misbehavior that disrupts the system 
with too many requests.  A selfish peer might request 
more than its fair share of resources for its own benefit, 
while a malicious peer might simply want to perform a 
denial-of-service attack by flooding the system with a 
large number of requests for disruption.  In a system 
with selfish and malicious peers present, a peer P1 
providing a resource can easily determine how many 
resources a requesting peer P2 is consuming from P1, 
but it is difficult for P1 to determine how many 
resources P2 is consuming from other nodes in the 
system.  If P2 were selfish or malicious, then this would 
allow P2 to make many moderately sized requests at 
many different nodes to get more than its fair share or 
disrupt the system.  If P1 contacts other peers to collect 
resource usage information for P2, then it also needs to 
consider the possibility that some of those peers might 
provide false information about P2. 
 
Given this vulnerability in p2p systems, it becomes 
clear that p2p systems need effective accounting 
systems where peers can determine the resource usage 
of requesting peers in order to enforce usage policies.  
Unlike client-server architectures where all of the 
accounting information can be maintained at a central 
server, p2p architectures will need an accounting 
system that is more robust and scalable.  
 
In this paper, we argue that probabilistic quorum 
systems [10] can be effectively applied to the problem 
of implementing accounting mechanisms for p2p 
systems without relying on a central server or nodes 
with special trusted status.  In our solution, a node will 
first query a quorum of peers to acquire the current 
resource usage account information for a requesting 
peer.  Based on that information, the requesting peer 
will be granted its request only if it is not found to have 
violated the system's usage policy.  The probabilistic 
character of such quorum systems allows us to tune 
parameters affecting the tradeoff between security and 
communication overhead in our protocol.  Probabilistic 
quorum systems also allow us to mask arbitrary failures 
from quorum members (e.g., failed or compromised 
peers providing false information). 
Although we use probabilistic quorum systems [10], 
which were initially developed for maintaining 
consistent copies of replicated data with high 
probability despite server failures, our key contribution 
is the application of such quorum systems to the 
specific problem of implementing a p2p accounting 
system. 
In the next section, we present related work.  Section 3 
introduces our probabilistic quorum-based accounting 
protocol.  A simulation-based performance evaluation 
follows in Section 4.  Finally, we conclude and discuss 
our future work in the last section. 
2. Related Work 
Yumerefendi and Chase discuss many accountability 
issues in dependable distributed systems at a high 
level, including the suggestion that probabilistic 
approaches might be more practical than enforcing full 
accountability [11].  Although they discuss many 
interesting issues, no concrete solution is proposed. 
 
The PlanetLab Central (PLC) infrastructure service 
uses a central database to enforce global resource 
utilization for an overlay testbed [12,13].  Such a 
centralized design lacks scalability and robustness to 
failures. 
 
SHARP is another infrastructure service developed for 
use with PlanetLab [14].  SHARP is a distributed 
resource management service where resources are 
acquired through the exchange of resource claims.  
Unlike our approach (which can be tuned to tolerate 
the desired number of peer failures), in SHARP, if any 
single peer along a resource exchange path fails, then a 
new path will have to be discovered.  This could 
significantly increase latency.  Similarly, Scrivener 
also requires "credit path" discovery to prevent free-
riding in content distribution networks [20]. 
 
Token-based accounting is a p2p accounting scheme 
based on exchanging tokens to access resources [15].  
The issuance of new tokens in their scheme involves 
the cooperation of a strict quorum of trusted peers.  
Although token-based accounting also uses quorums, it 
uses strict quorums rather than using probabilistic 
quorums as we do.  Also, unlike our approach, the 
quorums in token-based accounting are not designed to 
mask arbitrary failures among quorum members.  The 
use of quorums in token-based accounting is limited to 
the process of exchanging foreign tokens for new 
tokens while our protocol is built around probabilistic 
quorum systems.  Finally, token-based accounting 
requires a quorum of trusted peers while our 
probabilistic quorums can be selected among any peers 
in the system, which makes quorum selection easier. 
 
Oversight is another p2p accounting scheme for p2p 
media streaming systems, which relies on a subset of 
trusted nodes [16]. 
 
3. Probabilistic Quorum-Based Accounting 
(PQA) 
Probabilistic quorum-based accounting (PQA) is a p2p 
accounting system that relies on probabilistic quorums 
formed among regular nodes in the p2p system without 
requiring a central server or that any peers in the 
system have a special trusted status.  This distinguishes 
our work from previous work.  Accounting systems 
relying on central servers have a single point of failure, 
while systems relying on trusted nodes are vulnerable 
to the trusted nodes being targeted and compromised.  
To avoid these vulnerabilities, we chose a completely 
decentralized approach.  Also, we chose probabilistic 
quorum systems rather than strict quorum systems to 
give us the flexibility to tune our quorum sizes to the 
desired level of security as explained in the following 
subsections. 
The next subsection provides general background 
information on probabilistic quorum systems.  After 
that, we will describe our p2p accounting system 
protocol. 
3.1. Background 
 
A strict quorum system is defined as a set of subsets of 
servers where every pair of subsets from the set 
intersects with each other [10].  As mentioned in [11], 
quorum systems can be used effectively to coordinate 
servers.  Malkhi et al. introduce probabilistic quorum 
systems by relaxing the intersection property of strict 
quorum systems [10]. 
 
In probabilistic quorum systems, quorums are chosen 
according to some access strategy where each quorum 
will fail to intersect with some probability ε.  Such 
probabilistic quorum systems are referred to as ε-
intersecting quorum systems.  Unlike strict quorum 
systems, our use of probabilistic quorum systems in our 
protocol allows us to adjust the size of the quorum to 
tune the security provided by the accounting system.  
Probabilistic quorums also simplify the access strategy 
for selecting peers compared to strict quorums.  A 
more formal definition of probabilistic quorum 
systems, taken from [10], appears below. 
 
Definition.  Let Q be a set system, let w be an 
access strategy for Q, and let 0 < ε < 1 be 
given.  The tuple (Q,w) is an ε-intersecting 
quorum system if P(Q ∩ Q' ≠ Ø) ≥ 1 – ε, 
where the probability P is taken with respect 
to the strategy w. 
 
Malkhi et al. also provide a construction of ε-
intersecting quorum systems where the access strategy 
chooses a quorum of size l n  uniformly at random 
from a universe of n servers where l is a constant that 
determines the size of ε [10].  Malkhi et al. also define 
(b, ε)-masking quorum systems, which are similar to ε-
intersecting quorum systems, but every two quorums 
must have an intersection of at least size 2b + 1 [10].  
In (b, ε)-masking quorum systems, up to b arbitrary 
failures can be tolerated even if the data disseminated 
to the quorum is not self-verifying.  Please refer to [10] 
for more details and proofs concerning probabilistic 
quorum systems. 
3.2. Protocol 
 
To provide an accounting system for p2p systems, we 
have chosen to use (b, ε)-masking quorum systems 
with a construction similar to the one presented in 
[10].  In our protocol, a peer P1 desiring a resource or 
service located at peer P2 will send a request to peer P2.  
Assuming that each peer in the network has global 
membership information, P2 will then initiate a query 
phase where it randomly selects a quorum of size l n  
and requests each quorum member's view of how much 
P1 has consumed compared to how much P1 has 
produced (i.e., P1's accounting record).  Each view is 
an accounting record containing the number of 
resource units consumed and the number of resource 
units provided by a particular peer.  Of course, in 
general, peers that consume too much without 
providing anything in return should be denied future 
requests.  The exact restrictions, however, are specific 
to the particular accounting system policy to be 
enforced.  Our assumption about each peer having 
global membership information is reasonable in small 
overlay networks, such as the PlanetLab testbed [13].  
However, larger scale networks would need a more 
complex strategy to find a quorum of size l n  and 
developing an effective strategy to do this will be part 
of our future work. 
 
Due to the intersection property of (b, ε)-masking 
quorum systems, we can determine the correct 
accounting record for P1 based on replies to the query 
sent to the quorum even if b nodes in the quorum are 
malicious where malicious nodes falsify account 
information in their reply.  Based on this information, 
P2 will decide whether or not to grant the resource or 
service to P1 depending on the specific accounting 
policy.  If P2 grants a request to P1, then P2 will collect 
a receipt signed with P1's private key (i.e., the 
signature on these receipts can be verified with P1's 
public key) during the update phase.  The receipt 
should indicate that P2 provided r units to P1 where r is 
the number of units associated with that particular 
resource.  If P1 refuses to sign a receipt, then P2 will 
refuse to serve future requests from P1 and will report 
P1 to a reputation system, such as those that appear in 
[18,19].  After collecting the receipt, P2 will then 
disseminate copies of the receipt it receives from P1 to 
another randomly chosen quorum of size l n .  The 
members of this quorum will update their local views 
on P1's accounting record (of course, P1 and P2 will 
also update their respective views). 
   
We will set l according to the level of security required 
for the particular p2p application and the number of 
peers expected to be malicious, which is equal to b.  
Since we have chosen (b, ε)-masking quorum systems, 
then even if b of the nodes in a quorum intersection are 
malicious, we still have enough nodes correctly 
following the protocol to determine the correct account 
information.  Of course, larger values of the parameter 
l (i.e., larger quorum sizes) will increase the 
probability that any two quorums intersect, which 
increases the security of the accounting system because 
more nodes will have correct views of various peers' 
accounting records.  However, there is a tradeoff in 
that larger values of l also mean that more messages 
will be sent per request since quorum sizes are larger.  
Below in Figure 1, we illustrate our PQA protocol with 
an example.  Our example has the parameters l = 1 and 
n = 9 (i.e., quorum size is 3 for a network of 9 nodes). 
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Figure 1. PQA Protocol 
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1. Peer B requests a resource from peer C. 
2. C queries a randomly selected quorum for 
views of B's account record. 
3. Quorum responds to C with B's account 
information 
4. C grants or denies B's request 
5. If request is granted, B sends receipt to C 
6. C disseminates signed receipt from B to 
another randomly chosen quorum 
 
Due to space limitations, we cannot include the 
analysis from [10] that derives the exact error 
probability ε that two (b, ε)-masking quorums do not 
intersect given the necessary parameters.  However, 
our simulations presented in the next section provide 
some intuition on how increasing the quorum size also 
decreases the error probability ε, which leads to 
malicious nodes being granted fewer requests on 
average since larger quorums are more likely to 
intersect and are thus more likely to have up-to-date 
accounting information. 
4. Performance Evaluation 
We evaluated our solution by simulating a p2p network 
where nodes upload and download objects from each 
other.  Each requested object in our simulation was 
worth exactly 1 unit with the account of the uploader 
being credited 1 unit while the account of the 
downloader is debited 1 unit.  The policy to be 
enforced in our p2p network application simulation 
was that a peer should not be able to download greater 
than 5 units more than the number of units it has 
uploaded.  For example, if a peer has only uploaded 5 
objects, then that peer should not be able to download 
more than 10 objects in return.  Such a policy could be 
used in a real p2p application to prevent free-riding 
and denial-of-service attacks. 
 
Each simulation run had n = 900 nodes with a certain 
fraction of those nodes behaving maliciously.  
Malicious nodes in our simulation would each make 
100 download requests to random benign nodes 
without uploading any requests in return (i.e., they 
only download without uploading).  Also, in our 
simulation, whenever a malicious node was chosen to 
be a member of a quorum, the malicious node would 
provide false information indicating that the potential 
downloader was not violating the system's policy even 
if the potential downloader actually was in violation. 
 
As far as the well-behaved nodes in our simulation, 
benign nodes faithfully followed the PQA protocol as 
specified in the previous section without attempting to 
violate the system's accounting policy.  In our results 
below, we focus only on the effectiveness of our 
protocol at preventing malicious nodes from violating 
the system policy and the communication overhead. 
 
For our simulations, we measured the average 
percentage of requests granted to malicious nodes as 
we increase the size of the quorums used (remember, 
we can increase the size of the quorum by increasing 
the parameter l mentioned in Section 3).  More 
specifically, we set l = 1,…,20 for different simulation 
runs, which resulted in the different quorum sizes that 
appear in Figure 2 below.  We also considered two 
different scenarios in our simulations.  The first 
scenario had b = 9 malicious nodes while the second 
scenario had b = 45 malicious nodes. 
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Figure 2.  Average percentage of requests granted 
to malicious nodes as quorum size increases 
 
As expected, our results demonstrate the tradeoff 
between security and communication overhead when 
using the PQA protocol for a p2p accounting system.  
For smaller quorum sizes, we send fewer messages per 
download request, which indicates less communication 
overhead.  However, smaller quorum sizes also allow 
malicious nodes to download a larger fraction of the 
objects that they request.  On the other hand, larger 
quorum sizes lead to more security since larger 
quorums restrict the number of download requests 
granted to malicious nodes more effectively.  However, 
larger quorum sizes also lead to more communication 
overhead since more messages will have to be sent per 
download request.  It should be noted that malicious 
nodes will receive at least 5% of their requests due to 
the accounting policy used during our simulations.  Of 
course, our graphs also show that networks with fewer 
malicious nodes can use smaller quorums to achieve 
the same limit on the percentage of requests granted to 
malicious nodes. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Unlike previous approaches that rely on central servers 
or special peers with trusted status, probabilistic 
quorum-based accounting offers a flexible, effective 
solution to the problem of preventing selfish or 
malicious peers from consuming too many resources in 
a p2p system.  Our decentralized approach is based on 
the application of probabilistic quorum systems to this 
problem, which relaxes some of the quorum 
intersection requirements of strict quorum systems to 
allow more flexibility. 
Our future work will include a quorum selection 
strategy for p2p networks that does not have global 
membership information.  Also, we plan to complete a 
full implementation of our accounting system for real 
experiments on PlanetLab in the future. 
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